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Abstract
We study games in the presence of an interaction structure, which allows play-
ers to communicate their preferences, assuming that each player initially only
knows his own preferences. We study the outcomes of iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) that can be obtained in any given state of
communication.
We also give epistemic foundations for these “intermediate” IESDS outcomes.
This involves firstly describing the knowledge that the players would have in any
state of communication, using the framework from Apt et al. [4]. We then prove
that when there is common knowledge of rationality, each intermediate outcome is
entailed by the knowledge in the relevant state of communication.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
There is a substantial amount of research within game theory on the implications of
assumptions concerning players’ knowledge and beliefs [6]. In particular, Tan andWer-
lang [17] have shown that if payoffs are commonly known and all players are rational
and commonly believe in each other’s rationality, they will only play strategies that
survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). In this context
rationality means that one does not choose strictly dominated strategies.
Another line of research stresses the relevance of locality in strategic games. For
example, in graphical games [15] the locality assumption is formalized by assuming a
graph structure over the set of players and using payoff functions which depend only
on the strategies of players’ neighbors.
In this paper we study a game-theoretic framework which combines locality and
interaction. The locality assumption refers to the information about payoffs (or more
generally, preferences), rather than to the payoffs themselves. In turn, interaction takes
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place by means of communicationwithin (possibly overlapping) groups of players. The
framework is realized by incorporating the notion of a strategic game into the setting
of interaction structures discussed in [4].
An interaction structure consists of (possibly overlapping) groups of players within
which synchronous communication is possible. We assume that players’ preferences
are not commonly known. Instead, the initial information of each player only covers
his own preferences, and the players can communicate this information only within the
limits of the interaction structure.
More precisely, we make the following assumptions:
• the players initially know their own preferences;
• they are rational;
• they are part of an interaction structure and can communicate their own prefer-
ences within any group they belong to;
• communication is truthful and synchronous, as in [4];
• the players have no knowledge other than what follows from these assumptions,
and this is common knowledge.
In this setting we then study the outcome of iterated elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies started in some intermediate state of communication, in particular in
the state in which all communication permitted by the interaction structure has taken
place. We use the results from our previous work [4] to prove that this outcome can be
described by analyzing what the players know in the considered state.
It is important to note that we do not examine strategic or normative aspects of the
communication here. So we do not allow players to lie and do not examine why they
communicate or what they should communicate. Rather, we examine what happens if
they do communicate, assuming that they are rational and have reasoning powers.
To justify this focus, we can think of a setting in which the strategic aspects of com-
munication are not relevant. One possibility is when communication is not a deliberate
act, but rather occurs through observing somebody’s behavior. Such communication
is certainly more difficult to manipulate and more laborious to fake than mere words.
In a sense it is inherently credible, and research in social learning argues along similar
lines [9, Ch. 3].
This also helps to explain another assumption wemake, corresponding to the frame-
work we examined in [4]: players only communicate their own preferences, since in-
formation about others’ preferences is either difficult to obtain or communication about
them is not credible. One may also assume that communicating about preferences of
third parties is less common for privacy reasons. From this perspective the groups of
the interaction structure can be viewed as the ones who can commonly observe each
other, for example colleagues sharing lunch at work.
In other settings, for example that of artificial agents communicating by means of
messages, it may be more difficult to view communication as something non-deliberate.
Here, ignoring strategic aspects of communication can be interpreted as bounds on the
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players’ rationality or reasoning capabilities—they simply lack the capabilities to deal
with all the consequences of such an inherently rich phenomenon as communication.
In general, strategic communication is a research topic on its own, with controver-
sial discussions (see, e.g., [16]) and many questions widely open. Crawford and Sobel
[11] have considered the topic in a probabilistic setting, and Farrell and Rabin [13]
have looked at related issues under the notion of cheap talk. Also within epistemic
logic, formalizations of the information content of strategic communication have been
suggested, e.g., by Gerbrandy [14].
Finally, it is useful to clarify the relation between strategic games with interac-
tion structures and pre-Bayesian games, see, e.g., Ashlagi et al. [5]. In these games,
too, each player knows his payoff but does not know the payoffs of the other players
and makes no assumptions about them. In our setup this private knowledge aspect of
pre-Bayesian games can be trivially modelled by the empty interaction structure, or
viewed as corresponding to our initial situation. Due to the different nature of these
frameworks, however, the questions of interest are also different.
1.2 Plan of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. In the following Section 2, we review the basic
definitions concerning strategic games, optimality notions and operators on restrictions
of games. Next, in Section 3, we study the outcome of IESDS in the presence of an
interaction structure. We first look at the outcome that is arrived at after all communi-
cation permitted in the given interaction structure has taken place, and then detail the
outcomes obtained in any particular intermediate state of communication. The formu-
lations we consider make no direct use of the notion of knowledge. The connection
with knowledge is made in Section 4, where we prove the outcomes we have obtained
to be correct with respect to the epistemic framework from [4], in the sense that the
outcomes capture exactly what the players can do given their partial knowledge of the
game structure in any particular state. Finally, in Section 5, we suggest some future
research directions.
2 Preliminaries
Following [3], by a strategic game with parametrized preferences (in short, a game)
for playersN = {1, . . . , n}, where n > 1, we mean a tuple (S1, . . . , Sn,1, . . . ,n),
where for each i ∈ N ,
• Si is the non-empty, finite set of strategies available to player i. We write S to
abbreviate the set of strategy profiles: S = S1 × · · · × Sn.
• i is the strict preference relation for player i, so i⊆ S × S.
This qualitative approach precludes the use of mixed strategies, but they will not be
needed in our considerations.
As usual we denote player i’s strategy in a strategy profile s ∈ S by si, and the
tuple consisting of all other strategies by s−i, i.e., s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
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Similarly, we use S−i to denote S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × Sn, and for s′i ∈ Si
and s−i ∈ S−i we write (s′i, s−i) to denote (s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn). Finally,
we use s′i s−i si as a notational alternative for (s′i, s−i) i (si, s−i).
Fix now an initial strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn,1, . . . ,n). We say that
(S′1, . . . , S
′
n) is a restriction of G if each S′i is a non-empty subset of Si. We identify
the restriction (S1, . . . , Sn) with G.
To analyze iterated elimination of strategies from the initial game G, we view
such procedures as operators on the set of restrictions of G. This set together with
component-wise set inclusion forms a complete lattice.
For any restriction G′ := (S′1, . . . , S′n) of G and strategies si, s′i ∈ Si, we say
that si is strictly dominated by s′i on S′−i if s′i s′−i si for all s′−i ∈ S′−i.Then we
introduce the following abbreviations (` stands for “local” and g stands for “global”;
the terminology is from Apt [2]):
• sd`(si,G′)which holds iff strategy si of player i is not strictly dominated on S′−i
by any strategy from S′i (i.e., ¬∃s′i ∈ S′i ∀s′−i ∈ S′−i s′i s′−i si),
• sdg(si,G′) which holds iff strategy si of player i is not strictly dominated on
S′−i by any strategy from Si (i.e., ¬∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s′−i ∈ S′−i s′i s′−i si).
So in sdg , the global version of strict dominance introduced by Chen et al. [10], it
is stipulated that a strategy is not strictly dominated by a strategy from the initial game.
We call each relation of the form sd` or sdg an optimality notion. We say then
that the optimality notion φ used by player i ismonotonic if for all restrictions G′′ and
G′ and strategies si, G′′ ⊆ G′ and φ(si,G′′) implies φ(si,G′).
As noted in [8, 2], sdg is monotonic, while sd` is not (though in finite games their
respective outcomes coincide, as discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.2).
Given an operator T on a finite lattice (D,⊆)with the largest element> and k ≥ 0,
we denote by T k the k-fold iteration of T , where T 0 = > (so the iterations start “at
the top”) and put T∞ :=
⋂
k≥0 T
k. We call T monotonic if for all D′, D′′, we have
that D′ ⊆ D′′ implies T (D′) ⊆ T (D′′).
Finally, as in [4], an interaction structure H is a hypergraph on N , i.e., a set of
non-empty subsets of A ⊆ N , called hyperarcs.
3 Iterated strategy elimination
In this section we define procedures for iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies. Let us fix a strategic game G = (S1, . . . , Sn,1, . . . ,n) for players N , an
interaction structure H ⊆ 2N \ {∅}, and an optimality notion φ. In Section 3.1, we
look at the outcome reached after all communication permitted by H has taken place,
that is, when within each hyperarc of H all of its members’ preferences have been
communicated. In Section 3.2, we then look at the outcomes obtained in any particu-
lar intermediate state of communication. We stress that in general there is no relation
between the preferences i and H .
The formulations we give here make no direct use of a formal notion of knowledge.
The connection with a formal epistemic model is made in Section 4.
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All iterations of the considered operators start at the initial restriction (S1, . . . , Sn).
3.1 Completed communication
Let us assume that within each hyperarc A ∈ H , all its members have shared all in-
formation about their preferences. We leave the exact definition of communication to
Section 3.2 and the epistemic formalization to Section 4, and focus here on an opera-
tional description.
For each group of players G ∈ N , let SG denote the set of those restrictions of G
which only restrict the strategy sets of players from G. That is,
SG := {(S′1, . . . , S′n) | S′i ⊆ Si for i ∈ G and S′i = Si for i 6∈ G}.
Now we introduce an elimination operator TG on each such set SG, defined as follows.
For each G′ = (S′1, . . . , S′n) ∈ SG, let TG(G′) := (S′′1 , . . . , S′′n), where for all i ∈ N ,
S′′i :=
{ {si ∈ S′i | φ(si,G′)} if i ∈ G
S′i otherwise.
We call T∞G the outcome of iterated elimination (of non-φ-optimal strategies) onG.
We then define the restriction G(H) of G as1 G(H) := (G(H)1, . . . ,G(H)n), where
for all i ∈ N ,
G(H)i := T{i}
(⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A
)
i
.
That is, the ith component of G(H) is the ith component of the result of applying T{i}
to the intersection of T∞A for all A ∈ H containing i. We call G(H) the outcome
of iterated elimination (of non-φ-optimal strategies) with respect to H . Note that
G(H) implicitly depends on φ.
Let us “walk through” this definition to understand it better. Given a player i and
a hyperarc A ∈ H such that i ∈ A, T∞A is the outcome of iterated elimination on A,
starting at (S1, . . . , Sn). The strategies of players from outside ofA are not affected by
this process. This elimination process is performed simultaneously for each hyperarc
that i is a member of. By intersecting the outcomes, i.e., by considering the restriction⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A , one arrives at a restriction in which all such “groupwise” iterated elim-
inations have taken place. However, in this restriction some of the strategies of player i
may be non-φ-optimal. They are eliminated using one application of the T{i} operator.
We illustrate this process, and in particular this last step, in the following example.
Example 3.1. Consider local strict dominance, sd`, in the following three-player game
G where the payoffs of players 1 and 2 and those of players 1 and 3 respectively depend
on each other’s actions, but the payoffs of player 2 and 3 are independent:
Pl. 1
Pl. 2, 3
L, l L, r R, l R, r
U 1, 1, 1 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1 0, 0, 0
D 0, 1, 1 1, 1, 0 1, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
1Here and elsewhere the outer subscript ‘i’ refers to the preceding restriction.
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L  R l  r
U  D
Figure 1: Illustrating Example 3.1. Hyperarcs are shown in gray. Callouts attached
to hyperarcs represent communicated, and thus commonly known, information. The
thought bubble represents private information, in this case obtained from the combina-
tion of information only available to player 1.
So, for example, the payoffs for the strategy profile (U,L, r) are, respectively, 0, 1,
and 0. Now assume the interaction structureH = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. We obtain T∞{1,2} =
({U,D}, {L}, {l, r}) and T∞{1,3} = ({U,D}, {L,R}, {l}). The restriction defined by
these two outcomes is ({U,D}, {L}, {l}), and in the final step player 1 eliminates
his strategy D by one application of T{1}. The outcome of the whole process is thus
G(H) = ({U}, {L}, {l}). See Figure 1 for an illustration of this situation.
In this example, the outcome with respect to the given interaction structure coin-
cides with the outcome of the customary IESDS on the fully specified game matrix. We
should emphasize that this is not the case in general, and the purpose of this example is
simply to illustrate how the operators work. Example 3.3 later on shows in a different
setting how the interaction structure can influence the outcome.
Note that when H consists of the single hyperarc N that contains all the players,
then for each player i,
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A reduces to T
∞
N , and this is closed under applica-
tion of each operator T{i}. So then, indeed, G(H) = T∞N , that is, G(H) in this special
case coincides with the customary outcome of iterated elimination of non-φ-optimal
strategies.
In general, this customary outcome is included in the outcome w.r.t. any hyper-
graph H . This result is established in Theorem 3.2, and Example 3.3 shows a case
where the inclusion is proper.
Theorem 3.2. For φ ∈ {sd`, sdg} and for all hypergraphs H , we have T∞N ⊆ G(H).
The inclusion proved in this result cannot be reversed, even when each pair of play-
ers shares a hyperarc. The following example also shows that the hypergraph structure
is more informative than the corresponding graph structure.
Example 3.3. Consider the following strategic game with three players. The payoffs
of player 1 and 2 depend here only on each other’s choices, and the payoffs of player 3
depend only on the choices of player 2 and 3:
Pl. 1
Pl. 2
L R
U 0, 1 0, 0
D 1, 0 1, 1
Pl. 3
Pl. 2
L R
A 0 1
B 1 0
Payoff of players 1 and 2 Payoff of player 3
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So, for example, the payoffs for the strategy profile (U,L,A) are, respectively, 0,
1, and 0. If we assume the hypergraph H that consists of the single hyperarc {1, 2, 3},
then the outcome of iterated elimination of non-φ-optimal strategies w.r.t. H is the
customary outcome which equals ({D}, {R}, {A}). Indeed, player 1 can eliminate his
strictly dominated strategy U , then player 2 can eliminate L, and subsequently player 3
can eliminate B.
In contrast, if the hypergraph consists of all pairs of players, so H = {{1, 2},
{2, 3}, {1, 3}}, then the outcome of iterated elimination of non-φ-optimal strategies
w.r.t. H equals ({D}, {R}, {A,B}).
Informally, the reason for this difference is that in the latter case, player 3 can
eliminate B only using the fact that player 2 eliminated L, but this information is
available only to players 1 and 2.
To familiarize ourselves further with our definitions, we establish the following
intuitive monotonicity result. We say that H ′ extends H if for each A ∈ H there is
A′ ∈ H ′ such that A ⊆ A′.
Proposition 3.4. If H ′ extends H and T is monotonic, then G(H ′) ⊆ G(H).
3.2 Intermediate states
The setting considered in Section 3.1 corresponds to a state in which in all hyperarcs all
players have shared all information about their preferences. Given the game G and the
hypergraph H , the outcome G(H) there defined thus reflects which strategies players
can eliminate if initially they know only their own preferences and they communicate
all their preferences in H . We now define formally what communication we assume
possible, and then look at intermediate states, where only certain preferences have been
communicated.
Each player i can communicate his preferences to each A ∈ H with i ∈ A. We
take a message by i to consist of a preference statement s′i s−i si for si, s′i ∈ Si
and s−i ∈ S−i. We denote such a message by (i, A, s′i s−i si), and require that
i ∈ A and that it is truthful with respect to the given initial game G, that is, indeed
s′i s−i si in G. Note that the fact that i is the sender is, strictly speaking, never used.
Thus, in accordance with the interpretation of communication described in Section 1.1,
we could drop the sender and simply write “the players in A commonly observe that
s′i s−i si.” An intermediate state is now given by the setM of messages which have
been communicated.
We now adjust the definition of an optimality notion to account for intermediate
states. An intermediate optimality notion φG,M (derived from an optimality notion
φ) uses only information shared among the group G in the intermediate state given
byM . So with singletonG = {i} only i’s preferences are used, and with largerG only
preferences contained in messages to a superset of G are used. Thus in the case of sdg
we have that sdgG,M (si,G′) holds iff
¬∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S′−i s′i s−i si if G = {i}
¬∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S′−iM G s′i s−i si otherwise,
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where by M G s′i s−i si we mean that s′i s−i si is entailed by those messages
inM which G received. Specifically, the entailment relation
M G s′i s−i si
holds iff there exist messages (·, Gk, ski s−i sk+1i ) ∈M for k ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1} such
that Gk ⊇ G, s1i = s′i and s`i = si.
We now define a generalization of the TG operator by:
TG,M (G′) := (S′′1 , . . . , S′′n),
where G′ = (S′1, . . . , S′n) and for all i ∈ N ,
S′′i := {si ∈ S′i | φG,M (si,G′)}.
Note that, as before, S′i remains unchanged for i 6∈ G, since then φG,M (si,G′) always
holds. Indeed, for it to be false, there would have to be some message (i, G, ·) ∈ M ,
which would imply i ∈ G.
Similarly, we now define the outcome of iterated elimination (of non-φ-optimal
strategies) with respect to H,M to be the restriction G(H,M), where for i ∈ N
G(H,M)i := T{i},M
(⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M
)
i
.
Here H denotes the closure of H under non-empty intersection. That is,
H = {A1 ∩ · · · ∩Ak | {A1, . . . , Ak} ⊆ H} \ {∅}.
The use ofH is necessary because certain information may be entailed by messages
sent to different hyperarcs. For example, with (j, A, s′′j s−j s′j), (j, A′, s′j s−j sj) ∈
M , the combined information that s′′j s−j sj is available to the members of A ∩A′.
Again, let us “walk through” the definition of G(H,M). First, a local elimination
process is run on each hyperarc of H , using only information which has been commu-
nicated there (which now no longer covers all members’ preferences, but only the ones
according to the intermediate state M ). Then, in the final step, each player combines
his insights from all hyperarcs of which he is a member, and eliminates any strategies
that he thereby learns not to be optimal.
It is easy to see that in the case where the players have communicated all there is to
communicate, i.e., for
MallH := {(i, A, s′i s−i si) | i ∈ N,A ∈ H, si, s′i ∈ Si with s′i s−i si in G},
the intermediate outcome coincides with the previously defined outcome, i.e.,
G(H,MallH ) = G(H).
This corresponds to the intuition that G(H) captures the elimination process when all
possible communication has taken place. In particular, all entailed information has
also been communicated in MallH , which is why we did not need to consider H in
Section 3.1.
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U  D
M M ′ M ′′
Figure 2: Illustrating Example 3.5.
Example 3.5. The process described in this example is illustrated in Figure 2. Con-
sider again the game G from Example 3.1, and the initial state where M = ∅. We
have T∞A,M = G for all A ∈ H , that is, without communication no strategy can “com-
monly” be eliminated. However, players 2 and 3 can “privately” eliminate one of their
strategies each, since each of them knows his own preferences, so
T{1},M (
⋂
A:1∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ) = ({U,D}, {L,R}, {l, r}),
T{2},M (
⋂
A:2∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ) = ({U,D}, {L}, {l, r}),
T{3},M (
⋂
A:3∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ) = ({U,D}, {L,R}, {l}),
This elimination cannot be iterated upon by other players and the overall outcome is
G(H,M) = ({U,D}, {L}, {l}).
Consider now the intermediate stateM ′ = {(2, {1, 2}, L s−2 R) | s−2 ∈ S−2},
that is, a state in which player 2 has shared with player 1 the information that for any
joint strategy of players 1 and 3, he prefers his strategy L over R. Then only the result
of player 1 changes:
T{1},M ′(
⋂
A:1∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ′) = ({U,D}, {L}, {l, r}),
while the other results and the overall outcome remain the same. If additionally player 3
communicates all his information in the hyperarc he shares with player 1, that is, if the
intermediate state is M ′′ = M ′ ∪ {(3, {1, 3}, l s−3 r) | s−3 ∈ S−3}, then player 1
can combine all the received information and obtain
T{1},M ′′(
⋂
A:1∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ′′) = ({U}, {L}, {l}).
This is also the overall outcome G(H,M ′′), coinciding with the outcome G(H,MallH )
where all possible information has been communicated.
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A L B
A R C
B L C
1
3
2
4
 A  C
1
3
2
4
A  C
R −C L
1
3
2
4
A  C
R −C L
D  A,B,C
M M ′
Figure 3: Illustrating Example 3.6. Strategies of the dummy players are omitted. A 
C stands for A s−1 C, and −C combines α for α ∈ {A,B,D}. Note that in the
first step, information is not explicitly communicated but deduced.
Let us now illustrate the importance of using entailment in the intermediate opti-
mality notions and H (rather than H) in the definition of G(H,M).
Example 3.6. We look at a game involving four players, but we are only interested in
the preferences of two of them. The other two players serve merely to create different
hyperarcs. The strategies and payoffs of player 1 and 2 are as follows:
Pl. 1
Pl. 2
L R
A 3, 0 1, 1
B 2, 0 1, 1
C 1, 1 0, 0
D 0, 0 5, 1
For players 3 and 4 we assume a “dummy” strategy, denoted respectively by X
and Y . Consider the hypergraph H = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}} and the intermediate state
M = {(1, {1, 2, 3}, A LXY B),
(1, {1, 2, 4}, B LXY C),
(1, {1, 2, 3}, A RXY C)}.
The fact that player 1, independently of what the remaining players do, strictly prefersA
over C is not explicit in these pieces of information, but it is entailed by them, since
A LXY B and B LXY C imply A LXY C. However, this combination of
information is only available to the players in {1, 2, 3} ∩ {1, 2, 4}.
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Player 2 can make use of this fact that C is dominated, and eliminate his own strat-
egy L. If we now look at a state in which player 2 has communicated his relevant
preferences, so M ′ = M ∪ {(2, {1, 2, 3}, R αXY L) |α ∈ {A,B,D}}, we notice
that player 1 can in turn eliminate A and B, but only by combining information avail-
able to the players in {1, 2, 3} ∩ {1, 2, 4}. There is no single hyperarc in the original
hypergraph which has all the required information available. It thus becomes clear that
we need to take into account iterated elimination on intersections of hyperarcs.
The whole process is illustrated in Figure 3.
4 Epistemic foundations
In this section, we provide epistemic foundations for our framework. The aim is to
prove that the definition of the outcome G(H,M) correctly captures what strategies
the players can eliminate using all they “know”, in a formal sense.
We proceed as follows. First, in Section 4.1, we briefly introduce an epistemic
model formalizing the players’ knowledge. In Section 4.2, we give a general epis-
temic formulation of strict dominance and argue that it correctly captures the notion.
Section 4.2 also contains the main result of our epistemic analysis, namely that the
outcome G(H,M) indeed yields the outcome stipulated by the epistemic formulation.
We rely on the basic framework and results from [4], which we recall in Appendix A.
We focus on the global version of strict dominance, sdg , mainly because the pre-
sentation is then more concise. However, our results carry over to the local version sd`
due to the equivalence result mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
4.1 Epistemic language and states
Again, we assume a fixed game G with non-empty set of strategies Si for each player i,
and a hypergraphH representing the interaction structure. Analogously to [4], we use a
propositional epistemic language with a setAt of atoms which is divided into disjoint
subsets Ati, one for each player i, where Ati = {s′i s−i si | si, s′i ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i}.
The set Ati describes all possible strict preferences between pairs of strategies of
player i, relative to a joint strategy of the opponents. We consider the usual connectives
∧ and ∨ (but not the negation ¬), and a common knowledge operator CG for any
group G ⊆ N of players. As in [4], we write Ki for C{i}. By L+ we denote the
set of formulas built from the atoms in At using these two connectives and knowledge
operators.
A valuation V is a subset of At such that for each s−i ∈ S−i, the restriction
V ∩ {· s−i ·} is a strict partial order.
Intuitively, a valuation consists of the atoms assumed true. Each specific game G
induces exactly one valuation which simply represents its preferences. However, in
general we also need to model the fact that players may not have full knowledge of the
game. The restriction imposed on the valuations ensures that each of them is induced
by some game.
So for example {s a t} is a valuation (given a game with appropriate strategy
sets), while {s a t, t a u} and {s a t, t a s} are not.
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Recall from Section 3.2 that a message from player i to a hyperarc A ∈ H has
the form (i, A, s′i s−i si), where i ∈ A, si, s′i ∈ Si, and s−i ∈ S−i. We say that a
message (·, ·, p) is truthful with respect to a valuation V if p ∈ V . A state, or possible
world, is a pair (V,M), where V is a valuation and M is a set of messages that are
truthful with respect to V .
This setting is an instance of the framework defined in [4], and the formal seman-
tics is as defined there (see Appendix A for a brief summary). We repeat here only
the intuition that CGϕ means that ϕ is common knowledge among G, that is, every-
body inG knows ϕ, everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ, etc. In particular,Kiϕ
means that player i knows ϕ. We assume that each player i initially knows the true facts
in Ati entailed by the initial game G and that the basic assumptions from Section 1.1
are commonly known among the players.
4.2 Correctness result
We use results from [4], summed up in Appendix A, in order to prove that the TG
operator defined in Section 3 is correct with respect to an epistemic formulation of our
setting.
We start by giving an epistemic formula describing the global version of iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. In contrast to the formulation in Section 2,
this formula states player i knows that a strategy is strictly dominated.
We define, for i ∈ N and si ∈ Si,
dom1(si) := Ki
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i s
′
i s−i si,
dom`+1(si) := Ki
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈N\{i} dom
`(sj)
)
.
That is, in the base case, player i knows that si is strictly dominated if i knows that
there is an alternative strategy s′i which, for all joint strategies of the other players, is
strictly preferred. Furthermore, after iteration `+1, i knows that si is strictly dominated
if i knows that there is an alternative strategy s′i such that, for all joint strategies s−i
of the other players, either s′i is strictly preferred or some strategy sj in s−i is already
known by player j to be strictly dominated after iteration `.
We restrict our attention to formulas dom`(si) with ` ∈ {1, . . . , ˆ`}, where ˆ` =∑
i∈N |Si|. By the semantics of the considered formulas, there is some ` within this
range such that for all `′ ≥ `, dom`′ is equivalent to dom`. To reflect the fact that this
can be seen as the outcome of the iteration, we denote dom
ˆ`
by dom∞.
As a first connection with the TG operator defined in Section 3, we have the fol-
lowing epistemic counterpart of Proposition 3.4. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that
if we look at the states in which all communication allowed by a given hypergraph has
taken place, then knowledge (of positive formulas) can only grow as that hypergraph
grows.
Proposition 4.1. If H ′ extends H , then for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Si,
(V,MallH )  dom∞(si) implies (V,MallH′)  dom∞(si),
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whereMall is defined as in Section 3.2.
Proof. The claim follows from Lemma A.2 and the fact that dom∞(si) ∈ L+.
We now proceed to the main result of the paper. We prove that the non-epistemic
formulation of iterated elimination of non-sdg-optimal strategies, as given in Section 3,
coincides with the epistemic formulation of strict dominance.
Theorem 4.2. For any strategic game G, hypergraph H , set of messages M truthful
with respect to G, and i ∈ N ,
G(H,M)i = {si ∈ Si | (V,M) 2 dom∞(si)},
where V is the valuation induced by G.
5 Conclusions
We studied here strategic games in the presence of interaction structures. We assumed
that initially the players know only their own preferences, and that they can truthfully
communicate information about their own preferences within their parts of the interac-
tion structure. This allowed us to analyze the consequences of locality, formalized by
means of an interaction structure, on the outcome of the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. To this end we appropriately adapted the framework introduced
in [4] and showed that in any given state of communication this outcome can be de-
scribed by means of epistemic analysis.
We plan to extend our analysis in a number of ways by:
• Allowing players to send information about the preferences of other players that
they learned through interaction. The abstract epistemic framework of [4] in-
cludes already this extension,
• Allowing other forms of messages, for example, messages containing informa-
tion that a strategy has been eliminated, or containing epistemic statements, such
as knowing that some strategy of another player has been eliminated,
• Considering strategic aspects of communication, even if truthfulness is required
(should one send some piece of information or not?)
• Considering formation or evolution of interaction structures, given strategic ad-
vantages of certain interaction structures over others.
The last point could connect our research with that on network formation games,
see, e.g., [7].
Finally, let us mention that in [4] we already abstracted from the framework con-
sidered here and studied a setting in which players send messages that inform a group
about some atomic fact that a player knows or has learned. We clarified there, among
others, under what conditions common knowledge of the underlying hypergraph mat-
ters. The framework there considered could be generalized by allowing players to
13
arrive jointly at some conclusions using their background theories, by means of an
interaction through messages sent to groups. From this perspective IESDS could be
seen as a metaphor of such a conclusion. Through its focus on the form of allowed
messages and background knowledge, this study would differ from the line of research
pursued by Fagin et al. [12], where the effects of communication are considered in the
framework of distributed systems.
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A Results used from Apt et al. [4]
As described in Section 4.1, given some game we consider the basic propositions
(atoms)At to consist of disjoint subsetsAti, one for each player i. For each si, s′i ∈ Si,
and s−i ∈ S−i, Ati contains one atom s′i s−i si. A valuation is a subset of At,
consisting of those atoms that are true. We denote valuations by V and require that for
each i and each s−i ∈ S−i, the restriction V ∩ {· s−i ·} represents a strict partial
order (so it may indeed be the preference order induced by some game).2
A message has the form (i, A, s′i s−i si), where i ∈ A ∈ H , si, s′i ∈ Si, and
s−i ∈ S−i.
A state is a tuple (V,M)where V is a valuation andM is a set of truthful messages
(i, A, p), that is, indeed p ∈ V .
2 In [4] we did not consider such restrictions on valuations; however, the relevant results can easily be
seen to remain correct. See also [18, Chapter 2].
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For a set of messages M , G ⊆ N , and p ∈ At, M G p is defined as in Sec-
tion 3.2. That is,M G p means that p is entailed by the messages inM received by
G, for example, by transitivity of the represented preference order.
In [4], we defined set operations to act component-wise on states, e.g. (V,M) ⊆
(V ′,M ′) iff V ⊆ V ′ andM ⊆ M ′. However, the results we consider also hold with
a modified inclusion relation, where M ⊆ M ′ iff for each (i, A, p) ∈ M there is
(i, A′, p) ∈M ′ with A ⊆ A′.
We define an indistinguishability relation between states:
(V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) iff (Vi,Mi) = (V ′i ,M ′i).
For G ⊆ N the relation ∼G is the transitive closure of
⋃
i∈G ∼i.
We consider the following positive epistemic language L+:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | CGϕ,
where the atoms p denote the facts in At, ¬, ∧ and ∨ are the standard connectives; and
CG is a knowledge operator, with CGϕ meaning ϕ is common knowledge among G.
We write Ki for C{i}; Kiϕ can be read ‘i knows that ϕ’. For a sequence of players
w = i1 . . . ik, we writeKw to abbreviateKi1Ki2 . . .Kik .
The semantics is as follows:
Definition A.1.
(V,M)  p iff p ∈ V,
(V,M)  ϕ ∨ ψ iff (V,M)  ϕ or (V,M)  ψ,
(V,M)  ϕ ∧ ψ iff (V,M)  ϕ and (V,M)  ψ,
(V,M)  CGϕ iff (V ′,M ′)  ϕ for each (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′).
Now we are ready to state the following results from [4], slightly adapted to fit our
notation.
Lemma A.2 (from [4, Lemma 3.2]). For any ϕ ∈ L+ and states (V,M) and (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′),
if (V,M)  ϕ, then (V ′,M ′)  ϕ.
Theorem A.3 (from [4, Theorem 3.5]). For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+, state (V,M), and
G ⊆ N ,
(V,M)  CG(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M)  CGϕ1 ∨ CGϕ2.
Lemma A.4 (from [18, Lemma 2.3.8], cf. [4, Lemma 3.7]). For any G ⊆ N with
|G| ≥ 2, p ∈ At, and state (V,M), the following are equivalent:
(i) M G p,
(ii) (V,M)  CGp
Theorem A.5 (from [4, Theorem 3.8]). For any G ⊆ N , ϕ ∈ L+, and state (V,M),
(V,M)  CGϕ iff (V,M)  Kwϕ for some permutation w of G.
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B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First, consider φ = sdg , and G ⊆ G′ ⊆ N . By definition, this
implies that for all restrictions G′ we have TG′(G′) ⊆ TG(G′). Since φ is monotonic,
so is the operator TC for all C ⊆ N . Hence by a straightforward induction T∞N ⊆ T∞G
for all G ⊆ N , and consequently, for all players i,
T∞N ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A . (1)
Hence, for all i ∈ N ,
T∞N = T{i}(T
∞
N ) ⊆ T{i}(
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A ),
where the inclusion holds by the monotonicity of T{i}. Consequently T∞N ⊆ G(H).
We now prove the same claim for φ = sd`. We need to distinguish the TC operator
for φ = sd` and φ = sdg . In the former case we write TC,` and in the latter case
TC,g . The reason that we use the latter operators is that they are monotonic and closely
related to the former operators. Namely, as noted in [1], T∞N,` = T
∞
N,g , and the proof
carries over for N replaced by an arbitrary C ⊆ N . Now fix an arbitrary i ∈ N , then⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,g =
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,`,
and by (1) for φ = sdg , T∞N,g ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,g , so
T∞N,` = T
∞
N,g ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,`. (2)
Further, we have T∞N,` = T
∞
N,g and T
∞
N,g = T{i},g(T
∞
N,g), so T
∞
N,` = T{i},g(T
∞
N,`).
Hence, by (2) and monotonicity of T{i},g ,
T∞N,` = T{i},g(T
∞
N,`) ⊆ T{i},g(
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,`).
Also, for all i ∈ N and all restrictions G′ we have, by definition,
T{i},g(G′) ⊆ T{i},`(G′),
so by the last inclusion
T∞N,` ⊆ T{i},`(
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,`).
Consequently, T∞N,` ⊆ G(H), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We prove the following stronger proposition: If H ′ extends
H and for each G ∈ {{i} | i ∈ N} ∪H ∪H ′, TG is monotonic, then G(H ′) ⊆ G(H).
First note that for all restrictions G′:
G ⊆ G′ implies TG′(G′) ⊆ TG(G′). (3)
To see this, suppose that G ⊆ G′. Then for all i ∈ N , either
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• i ∈ G, in which case i ∈ G′, so TG(G′)i = TG′(G′)i, or
• i 6∈ G, in which case TG(G′)i = G′i ⊇ TG′(G′)i.
In each case, TG′(G′)i ⊆ TG(G′)i.
From (3) and the monotonicity of TG and TG′ , it follows that:
G ⊆ G′ implies T∞G′ ⊆ T∞G . (4)
Now we show that if H ′ extends H , then
⋂
A′:i∈A′∈H′ T
∞
A′ ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A : Fix
i ∈ N and take some si 6∈ (
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A )i. Then there is A ∈ H such that i ∈ A
and si 6∈ (T∞A )i. Then since H ′ extends H , there is A′ ∈ H ′ such that A ⊆ A′, so by
(4), si 6∈ (T∞A′ )i ⊇
⋂
A′:i∈A′∈H′ T
∞
A′ .
So, since each T{i} is monotonic,
G(H ′)i = T{i}
(⋂
A′:i∈A′∈H′ T
∞
A′
)
i
⊆ T{i}
(⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A
)
i
= G(H)i.
Preparing the proof of Theorem 4.2. In order to prove this result, we need some prepara-
tory steps.
Lemma B.1. For any ` ≥ 1, i ∈ N , si ∈ Si, and state (V,M),
(V,M)  dom`+1(si)
iff (V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
(Kis′i s−i si) ∨
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom`(sj)
)
.
Proof. We have
(V,M)  dom`+1(si)
iff (by definition)
(V,M)  Ki
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈N\{i}
dom`(sj)
)
iff (by Theorem A.3)
(V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
Kis
′
i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈N\{i}
Kidom`(sj)
)
iff (V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
Kis
′
i s−i si ∨
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom`(sj)
)
.
The last step holds by Lemma A.4 and Theorem A.5 since dom`(sj) = Kj(· · · ).
Lemma B.2. For any ` ≥ 1, i ∈ A ∈ H , si ∈ Si, and state (V,M),
si 6∈ T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)i iff (V,M)  CAdom`(si).
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Proof. By induction on `. The base case follows straightforwardly from the definitions.
Now assume the claim holds for `. Then, focusing on the interesting case where A 6=
{i}, we have the following chain of equivalences:
si 6∈ T `+1A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)i
iff (by definition)
si 6∈ T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)i or ¬sdgA,M (si, T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn))
iff (by monotonicity of sdg)
¬sdgA,M (si, T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn))
iff (by definition)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)−iM A s′i s−i si
iff ∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i M A s′i s−i si or
s−i 6∈ T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)−i
iff ∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i M A s′i s−i si or
∃j ∈ A \ {i} sj 6∈ T `A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)j
iff (by induction hypothesis)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i M A s′i s−i si or
∃j ∈ A \ {i} (V,M)  CAdom`(sj)
iff (by Lemma A.4)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i (V,M)  CAs′i s−i si or
∃j ∈ A \ {i} (V,M)  CAdom`(sj)
iff (V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−1
(
CAs
′
i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom`(sj)
)
iff (by Theorem A.3)
(V,M)  CA
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−1
(
s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈A\{i}
dom`(sj)
)
iff (V,M)  CAdom`+1(si).
We are now ready to prove the main result.
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Proof of Theorem 4.2. We have:
si 6∈ G(H,M)i
iff (by definition)
si 6∈ T{i},M (
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M )i
iff ¬sdg{i},M (si,
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M (S1, . . . , Sn))
iff ∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)−i s
′
i s−i si
iff ∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i s′i s−i si or
s−i 6∈
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)−i
iff ∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i s′i s−i si or
∃A : i ∈ A ∈ H s−i 6∈ T∞A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)−i
iff ∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i s′i s−i si or
∃A : i ∈ A ∈ H ∃j ∈ A \ {i} : sj 6∈ T∞A,M (S1, . . . , Sn)j
iff (by Lemma B.2)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i s′i s−i si or
(V,M) 
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom∞(sj)
iff (since s′i s−i si ∈ Ati)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i (V,M)  Kis′i s−i si or
(V,M) 
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom∞(sj)
iff (V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
(Kis′i s−i si) ∨
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom∞(sj)
)
iff (by Lemma B.1)
(V,M)  dom∞(si).
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